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Brutal Visions 
Mimicry, Biosemiotics, and the Animal-Human Binary in Thomas Belt’s The Naturalist in 
Nicaragua 
Will Abberley 
In 1863 Charles Darwin published an article enthusing about a new concept in natural history: 
protective mimicry. The term had been coined by Henry Walter Bates, an entomologist who had 
observed numerous uncanny resemblances between different species of insect in the Amazon. 
Bates argued that such mimicry was a survival strategy; insects vulnerable to predators evolved 
to resemble other species that predators knew to be distasteful. With each generation, the 
individuals that more closely resembled the model species were more likely to be left alone, 
while those who deviated from this model were more likely to be eaten, rendering the mimicry 
ever-more perfect. Bates claimed that other species’ uncanny resemblances to vegetation or 
stones had developed in the same way, as random variations helped certain individuals to survive 
while their more conspicuous brethren died out (see Bates 1862). In the following years, 
naturalists would argue for the existence of many other forms of biological mimicry, from 
camouflaged predators to plants that tricked insects into spreading their pollen by mimicking the 
appearance of nectar.1 Biological mimicry confounded mechanistic models of animal life. Earlier 
naturalists had noticed uncanny resemblances between different species, and between organisms 
and other natural objects, but often explained them away as either unimportant coincidences or 
proofs of the creator’s love of symmetry and patterns (Komarek 1998, 24–28). Such explanations 
framed the animal world as senseless, acquiring meaning only through the intelligent perceptions 
of human observers. Conversely, biological mimicry suggested that nonhuman perceptions and 
interpretations were fundamental to nature’s processes. Darwin queried rhetorically, “Why to the 
perplexity of naturalists has Nature condescended to the tricks of the stage?” (1863, 220–21). 
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Part of the reason for naturalists’ “perplexity” had been that they approached animals as rigid 
machines rather than sentient beings that inhabited not only physical environments but also fields 
of mutual perception and semiosis. 
This article argues that biological mimicry unsettled, and continues to unsettle, 
anthropocentric binaries between humans and animals, and nature and culture. Mimicry, 
therefore, offers a potent motif for cultural theorists who seek to destabilize nature and animality 
as categories and build more politically engaged and critical models of “post-nature” or “ecology 
without nature” (see Curry 2008; Morton 2007). Bruno Latour has suggested replacing the 
concept of nature with “compositionism,” that is, the recognition that nature is not “a true world 
of realities lying behind a veil of appearances” but a contingent human construct (2010, 474–75). 
Latour argues that Western scientific materialism hides the composted (in the etymological 
sense) nature of nature, presenting it as an objective reality reducible to mechanistic 
“concatenations” of causes (482). This model of nature renders agency exclusively human, while 
the universe outside of humanity seems wholly ruled by necessity. Conversely, Latour frames the 
world as networks of agential mediators instead of mechanistic causes. He writes, 
Nature is always already assembled, since nothing happens but what comes from before. 
It is enough to have the causes, the consequences will follow, and they will possess 
nothing of their own except the carrying further of the same indisputable set of 
characteristics. . . . This is why rationalists never detect the contradiction between what 
they say about the continuity of causes and consequences and what they witness—namely 
the discontinuity, invention, supplementarity, creativity . . . between associations of 
mediators. They simply transform this discrepancy (which would make their worldview 
untenable) into a radical divide between human subjects and nonhuman objects. For 
purely anthropocentric—that is, political—reasons, naturalists have built their collective 
to make sure that subjects and objects, culture and nature remain utterly distinct, with 
only the former having any sort of agency (482–83). 
Latour suggests that the scientific materialist edifice of mechanistic “nature” depends on a 
selective blindness toward the frequent gaps between causes and consequences. I suggest that, 
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since its first theorization in the nineteenth century, biological mimicry has persistently 
challenged this dogmatic denial of nonhuman agency. Conceptualizing the phenomenon 
involved the humbling notion that seeing and interpreting were not exclusively human activities 
but occurred across the animal kingdom and influenced organisms’ evolution through constant 
feedback loops. Naturalists who wished to understand the history of life on Earth were 
compelled to give up or, at least, loosen anthropocentric oppositions between human subjectivity 
and agency on the one hand and animal automatism on the other. 
I will briefly trace the history of biological mimicry as an idea that developed in dialogue 
with models of animal perception and agency, culminating in the recently emerged field of 
biosemiotics, which redefines signs and interpretation as processes occurring throughout the 
organic world. I will then explore the implications of these ideas for decomposting animal-
human binaries through a zoocritical close reading of one Victorian text that documented various 
examples of animal mimicry and deception. The text is The Naturalist in Nicaragua  (1874), a 
travel memoir by the mining engineer and naturalist Thomas Belt. I argue that Belt’s depictions 
of animal deception vacillated between presenting the animals involved as intelligent or sentient 
agents and, conversely, as passive units in mechanistic natural processes. However, Belt’s vision 
of biological mimicry was more concerned with the subjectivity of signal receivers than senders, 
with the interpretation of signs than possible intentions behind them. By treating mimicry and 
deception as systemic relations between signs, referents and interpreters, Belt obviated 
intentionality in communication and prefigured the logic of biosemiotics. Further, by narrating 
his personal encounters with mimetic and deceptive animals in the wild, Belt challenged 
divisions between humans and animals, encouraging readers to imagine life from the perspective 
of the deceivers’ prey and predators. His use of personal anecdote as evidence for biological 
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mimicry suggested that animals’ experiences of such deceptions could be inferred through his 
own experiences of being dazzled and duped. In this way, the sensory body becomes a vehicle 
for empathizing with other species, imaginatively glimpsing fragments of their subjective 
worlds. 
Imagining Brutal Vision 
 
First, let us consider how science has often functioned to deny animals semiotic agency, before 
exploring how biological mimicry upset this assumption. In the medieval period, philosophers 
argued for the existence of symbolic systems in the organic world. Concepts of nature as a book 
of moral analogies sat alongside medicinal doctrines of natural signatures, which assumed that 
plants resembled body parts that they were intended to treat.2 However, these imagined natural 
sign systems were generally anthropocentric, framing nature’s objects as meaningful only insofar 
as they acted as a channel of communication between humans and the creator. Animals and 
plants were not usually considered as humans’ fellow addressees in such systems; rather, they 
were the passive, material carriers of the systems’ messages. The gradual rise of inductive 
science eroded belief in such natural signs as investigators like Isaac Newton, Galileo Galilei, 
and John Ray increasingly studied nature’s objects as things in themselves without any symbolic, 
human-centered meaning. Peter Harrison links this rejection of analogy in nature to literalist, 
Protestant approaches to the Bible, arguing that the scientific revolution constituted a 
literalization and designification of the world. He writes, 
For a denial of the legitimacy of allegory is in essence a denial of the capacity of things to 
act as signs. . . . Literalism means that only words refer; the things of nature do not. In 
this way the study of the natural world was liberated from the specifically religious 
concern of biblical interpretation, and the sphere of nature was opened up to new 
ordering principles. The mathematical and taxonomic categories imposed by Galilei and 
Ray on physical objects and living things represent an attempt to reconfigure a natural 
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world which had been evacuated of order and meaning (Harrison 1998, 4). 
This modern designification was manifested in reconceptualizations of nature and its life-forms 
as machines. The English natural theologian William Paley compared the organic world to a 
watch, its species living in perfect balance with each other like the springs and cogs in a 
timepiece. Similarly, on a smaller scale, René Descartes and Julien Jean Offray de La Mettrie 
argued that animals were, effectively, machines following fixed patterns of behavior that were 
predetermined by their morphologies and instincts.3 The animals-as-machines hypothesis never 
enjoyed universal support, but it gained in power through the nineteenth century as philosophers 
and scientific investigators strove for ever-stronger distinctions between things and ideas, objects 
and subjects. The hardening binary between thought and matter framed the attribution of inner 
life to animals as naïve self-projection, expressed by the perennial bugbear of the professional 
life sciences: anthropomorphism (Weemans and Prévost 2014, 4). 
The consequence of this trend was a hollowing out of animal subjectivity. John Berger 
noted that images in the modern life sciences typically represent animals as wholly separate from 
humans, and apprehension as a one-way process from humans to animals. Berger declares, 
“Animals are always the observed. The fact that they can observe us has lost all significance. 
They are the objects of our ever-extending knowledge” (1980, 16). The anthropocentric 
privileging of the human gaze suppresses animals’ perceptions not only of humans but also of 
each other—they are reduced to puppets of instinct, which cannot really perceive at all. Cartesian 
dualism, Berger observes, “bequeathed the body to the laws of physics and mechanics. . . . The 
animal has been emptied of experience and secrets” (11–12). This expungement of animal 
subjectivity was intensified through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the rise of modern, 
experimental science, which constructed animals as laboratory objects in which reactions could 
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be predictably induced through controlled manipulation and replicable procedures. While 
physiology approached animals as collections of organic processes and reflexes, behaviorist 
animal psychology reduced them to products of conditioning, blindly shaped by patterns of 
stimulus and response.4 
However, as Eileen Crist has argued, antianthropomorphism led to an equally dogmatic 
mechanomorphism by which animals’ actions were assumed to be driven by nonagential, 
automatic causes (1999, 2–7). Although anthropomorphism might seem inherently 
anthropocentric, the modern stigmatization of anthropomorphism is arguably more so since it 
limits subjectivity to humans and objectifies all the rest of the living world. “Is not this going 
rather far?” complained the French sociologist Roger Caillois, who was much interested in insect 
mimicry, “Does this not isolate man unduly, under the pretext of not projecting on to another 
species . . . what seems to belong to him alone?” After all, Caillois remarked, since man is an 
animal, it seems reasonable to expect “to find elsewhere the characteristics of his nature, or, on 
the other hand, to rediscover in him the laws that one sees operating in other species” (1964, 16). 
In contrast to such human-centered discourse, Pierre Montebello advocates a “higher 
anthropomorphism,” which acknowledges likely continuities between human and animal 
experience without privileging humans as the standard of measurement. Montebello writes, “To 
anthropomorphize in an empirical way is to project oneself into things, to see oneself exactly in 
the variety of the world. By contrast, the method of higher anthropomorphism suggests that one 
can find man in all things because he is similar in nature to all things, with varying degrees of 
difference. . . . Higher anthropomorphism seizes man at his root: and his root is cosmos.”5 
Protective mimicry necessarily involved imagining the misperceptions of animals that 
were duped by resemblances, usually through the naturalist’s own experiences of being misled 
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by resemblances in the field. The idea that vision could be a vehicle of interspecies empathy was 
a new one. Traditionally, Western philosophy had privileged human vision as a special kind of 
knowledge that transcended the mere organs of sight.6 Yet the development of optical physiology 
and psychology through the nineteenth century had undermined such beliefs, emphasizing the 
limits, unreliability, and materiality of vision.7 Studies into the nervous processes involved in 
sensation split sight into a flow of raw sense impressions, on the one hand, and a bank of mental 
associations interpreting it, on the other (Teukolsky 2009, 51–56). Instead of being qualitatively 
different from animal vision, human vision seemed to be distinguished only by its greater 
associative accumulation and coordination. Darwinism enhanced this materialization of vision, 
suggesting that the sense of beauty was not a metaphysical or uniquely human condition but a 
faculty existing across species, serving the utilitarian causes of survival and reproduction (Smith 
2006, 276–85). Instead of viewing nature’s shapes and colors as art designed by God for humans 
to appreciate, Darwin and his followers presented them as environmental conditions that every 
sighted animal responded to and, thus, helped to form. Hence, the Victorian science writer Grant 
Allen claimed that “from the coarse animal pleasure of beholding food mankind has already 
developed, through delicate gradations, our modern disinterested love for the glories of sunset” 
(1879, 282). From this new, Darwinian perspective, the organic world needed to be studied as a 
network of appearances and interpretations. The Oxford entomologist and theorist of protective 
mimicry Edward Bagnall Poulton summed up the imaginative leap that such studies involved 
when he wrote, “We argue from the effect produced by certain colours, forms, or attitudes upon 
ourselves, to the effect that must be produced upon other animals” (1884, 52–53). As I will show 
in my textual analysis of Belt’s memoir below, studying protective mimicry meant trying to 
picture the world through other species’ eyes. 
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At the same time, though, challenging the binary opposition between humans and animals 
does not have to imply humanizing animals—it could mean, conversely, animalizing humans. 
Human actions that seem intelligent and agential might, through the prism of species-wide 
behavioral tendencies, acquire a mechanistic aspect similar to many animal actions. Let it be 
remembered that Darwin’s mechanism of evolution by natural selection was derived from 
economic theory, which reduced humans to populations blindly multiplying, the same as 
animals.8 The potential of evolutionary continuity between humans and animals to undermine 
individual autonomy in the former was most memorably summed up by Darwin’s disciple 
Thomas Henry Huxley in 1874. Consciousness, Huxley wrote, might be related to the body’s 
actions “simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely without any power 
of modifying that working as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive 
engine is without influence upon its machinery” (1901, 240). Hence, “our mental conditions are 
simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the 
organism” (Huxley 1901, 244). Huxley viewed consciousness as being of little importance in 
biology since, in his opinion, it could merely register instinctive drives behind action without 
influencing them. 
In line with such determinism, protective mimicry as a concept had the power to remodel 
deception as a mechanistic law of life, occurring across the animal and human worlds 
irrespective of individual consciousness. Bates’s colleague Alfred Russel Wallace commented in 
1867, 
It is to be particularly observed that the word “mimicry” is never used in this article in the 
sense of voluntary imitation. It here means a particular kind of resemblance only; a 
resemblance not in internal structure but in external appearance; a resemblance in those 
parts only that catch the eye; a resemblance that deceives. As this kind of resemblance 
has the same effect as voluntary imitation or mimicry, and as there is no word in the 
language that expresses the required meaning, “mimicry” was adopted (17). 
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Although the interspecies resemblances described had the same effect that intentional imitation 
would have had, they were produced by pure chance—that is to say, by a series of random 
variations from one generation to the next. Protective mimicry was not merely a metaphoric use 
of language but a reconceptualization of imitation and deception from ethically freighted human 
activities into amoral laws of nature. 
Animalizing Mimicry 
 
This reconceptualization of mimicry and deception as communication without the need for a 
conscious sender has continued to interest observers from the twentieth century to the present, 
seeming to promise both to dissolve differences between humans and animals and to consolidate 
them. For example, Caillois compared insect mimicry to humans’ interest in masks and 
disguises, arguing that mimicry reflected universal, transspecies tendencies toward aesthetic 
patterns, imitation and intimidation. Adopting a psychoanalytic frame, he suggested that insect 
camouflage stemmed from a primordial urge toward “assimilation to the surroundings,” a kind of 
cosmic death drive ([1935] 1984, 27). Perhaps more convincingly, he later compared insects’ 
ocelli, spots resembling the eyes of larger animals, with humans’ use of masks as “an instrument 
of intimidation and political power” (1964, 106). Regardless of the intentionality of human or 
animal masking, Caillois wrote, “the repertoire of frightening appearances is limited and 
applicable to all creatures. . . . The effect sought for is the same, and the method of getting it too” 
(1964, 120–22). Semiosis cuts across animal and human experience less in terms of the 
conscious manipulation of signs than in their interpretation by receivers. Semiosis, Caillois 
implies, is primarily about the reception and extrapolation of meanings from signs rather than the 
agencies or intentions that might have formed them. However, Caillois still sometimes partly 
10 
endorsed the traditional, Cartesian division between mechanical animals and human subjects due 
to a larger ideological agenda. Influenced by the surrealist movement, he sought to present insect 
mimicry as an example of paradoxical creativity without agency and intelligence without thought 
(Cheng 2009, 72). Hence, Caillois concluded, “The success of man, or his misfortune perhaps, is 
to have introduced an element of play into the rigid machinery [of nature]” (1964, 127). Caillois 
was more interested in mechanizing aspects of human life than finding agency in the nonhuman. 
This denial of communicative agency to animals has since been refined and (more often) 
countered from numerous quarters. Jacques Lacan argued that humans were conscious that they 
existed as objects of perception and could thus manipulate and “play” with their appearances, 
while animals were incapable of such true self-representation. Human disguises are infinitely 
changeable, he claimed, but the animal is “captured” by its disguise, most obviously in the 
mimetic semblance that is built into its physical form (1977, 107; see also Silverman 2000, 134–
36). However, as Jacques Derrida pointed out in his critique of Lacan, modern psychology has 
undermined faith in the human sovereign ego, blurring the boundaries between conscious and 
unconscious action (2008, 119–25). Phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have 
questioned traditional distinctions between subject and object, arguing for the centrality of the 
body in perception, which positions humans on an experiential continuum with other species 
(2002, 379–89). Further, the rise of structuralism and poststructuralism in the twentieth century 
has generated models for conceptualizing semiosis irrespective of intentionality. While 
Ferdinand de Saussure (2013) divided semiosis into sign and semantics, Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1994) conceived a triadic structure of sign, referent, and interpretant (the effect of a sign on its 
interpreter). Moreover, models of meaning as a constant process of deferral have undermined 
traditional notions of the author or sign maker as an agent controlling meaning (see Derrida 
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2001; Barthes 1977). This reconceptualization of signs as matters of effect rather than intention 
has opened up new possibilities for thinking about semiosis as a field of phenomena that 
imbricates humans with other organisms rather than separating them. As the scholar Timo Maran 
notes, Peirce’s definition of a sign as “something which stands to somebody for something in 
some respect or capacity” dovetails closely with “the essential research question of biological 
mimicry.100 . . . What resembles what to whom in what respect?” (2001, 243–57).9 
At the same time, developments in the life sciences through the twentieth century 
established a firm basis for theorizing about animal perceptions. After studying the sense organs 
of many creatures, the Baltic-German biologist Jakob von Uexküll contended that all sensory 
beings should be considered as subjects inhabiting their own perceptual world, or Umwelt. 
Organisms sharing a common environment, he wrote, coexisted in “circuits of meaning,” acting 
as, respectively, “carriers” and “utilizers” (or receivers) of salient signs to each other (2010, 
172). Hence, Uexküll concluded, “every living thing is a subject that lives in its own world, of 
which it is the center. It cannot, therefore, be compared to a machine, only to the machine 
operator who guides the machine” (45). This approach to animals as perceptive subjects grew in 
tandem with ethological studies of biological mimicry as researchers modeled mimicry as a 
triadic system divided between mimic (the imitating organism), model (the organism or object 
being imitated), and signal receiver (the organism that conflates these organisms) (see Wickler 
1968; Vane-Wright 1976). From this perspective, crypsis, or camouflage, could be redefined as a 
“nonsignal,” involving an organism failing to register in a perceiver’s Umwelt rather than 
registering as something it is not (Maran 2001, 331). In the last decades of the century, the 
American semiotician Thomas Sebeok strove to expand semiotics into animal communication 
and perception, popularizing terms such as “biosemiotics” and “zoosemiotics.” Importing 
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Peircian sign classifications into biology, he argued that organisms’ survival depended on “the 
correct decipherment of indexical signs ceaselessly barraging their Umwelt” (1990, 95–96). 
Further, he described protective mimicry as a form of iconicity, since it involves signification 
through resemblance. 
In current theoretical biology, this semiotic approach to mimicry is challenging animal-
human and nature-culture binaries in radical ways. The Danish biologist Jesper Hoffmeyer 
observes that “genocentric” biochemistry and microbiology present “genetic information” as “a 
simple causal factor,” much like Latour’s mechanistic “concatenations” of causes (2010, 157–
58). Yet, Hoffmeyer observes, “genetic information does not simply ‘cause’ things to happen”; 
the functioning of genes is shaped by myriad environmental influences (158). He thus suggests 
“signs” as a better paradigm for understanding biological phenomena than mechanistic 
“information,” because signs “are not causes in the traditional sense of (Aristotelian) efficient 
causality, for the effect of a sign is not compulsory but depends upon a process of interpretation, 
and the interpretation may well be—and probably most often is—‘mistaken’” (159). Protective 
mimicry is an obvious example of such slippage between cause and effect, involving the 
subjective interpretation of a signal receiver. Indeed, Hoffmeyer suggests that organisms being 
the receivers in such relationships could have been crucial to the development of perception and 
cognition. As mimetic species evolved evermore-perfect resemblances, he claims, this selection 
pressure would cause their prey or predators to evolve “more sophisticated forms of ‘semiotic 
freedom’ in the sense of an increased capacity for responding to a variety of signals through the 
formation of (locally) meaningful interpretants” (164). For example, mammals have evolved to 
scrutinize the world through a variety of complex sensory systems. These systems are further 
elaborated by cognitive capacities that enable them to recall many aspects of their impressions 
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(such as animals’ characteristic styles of movement or hiding places) and so cross-reference 
these impressions and read more identificatory cues (see Maran 2015, 217). In this way, 
Hoffmeyer presents biosemiotics as a paradigm for bridging the apparent gulf between a 
mechanistic material universe and subjective consciousness. More automatic forms of semiosis 
at the cellular level can be imagined as scaffolding101 the emergence of more semiotically free 
systems of interpretation. A trajectory can thus be plotted through animals’ increasingly complex 
cognitive-perceptual subjectivity to the highly abstract, flexible, and self-aware symbolism of 
human language. Hoffmeyer declares, “Instead of the Cartesian either-or thinking, biosemiotics 
institutes a more-or-less thinking” (165). The supposed categorical distinction between agential 
human lies and mindless animal deception thus collapses into a continuum. 
The Biosemiotics of Mimicry in Belt’s The Naturalist in Nicaragua 
 
The remainder of this essay will contend that such biosemiotic thinking was foreshadowed by 
nineteenth-century field naturalists studying mimicry who empathized imaginatively with the 
animals being deceived. I will pursue this claim through a close reading of Thomas Belt’s 
Naturalist in Nicaragua, which contains many anecdotes of deceptive appearances and behavior 
witnessed among animals in the country. These anecdotes vacillate between anthropomorphizing 
and mechanomorphizing animals, as well as zoomorphizing the narrator as his immediate 
sensory impressions are offered as proxies for the experiences of animals.10 While Belt remains 
uncertain of which animals are capable of consciously deceiving and to what extent, his text 
ultimately frames deception among animals as systemic and dependent on the psychology of the 
signal receivers rather than the senders. The possible intentionality of the deceiving party fades 
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into irrelevance as Belt explores the complex, shifting worlds of appearance that animals inhabit 
and how these perceptual worlds, or Umwelten, reshape their environments. Belt’s descriptions 
of his encounters with mimetic and deceptive animals in the wild exemplify Anat Pick’s concept 
of “creaturely poetics,” which depicts experiential overlap between humans and animals based 
on the “corporeal reality of living bodies” (2011, 3). Belt’s anecdotes are also comparable with 
Nicole Seymour’s model of ecological consciousness as “an empathetic looking with” rather 
than an othering “looking at” (2013, 118). Belt achieves the former effect through his efforts to 
understand the dynamics of deception among animals by placing himself in the position of signal 
receiver. The naturalist is able to reflect detachedly on his impressions and thus construct 
abstract theories about the world. Yet, in the immediate moment of being deceived by animals, 
he inhabits a comparable experiential space to these creatures’ natural prey and foes. In such 
moments, the narrative focalization shifts from the intellectually distant scientist to a visceral 
sentience that blurs species boundaries.11 Belt developed this protobiosemiotic view partly 
through the hybrid genre of the naturalist’s travel memoir, which mixed scientific discussion 
with autobiographical impressions.12 Working in this form, Belt was able to use his personal, 
subjective experiences of Nicaragua’s natural environments to imaginatively enter their 
intraspecies semiotic networks, or “semiospheres.”13 
Thomas Belt was an engineer and geologist from Newcastle who spent four years in 
Nicaragua on a gold-mining project. In his spare time during this period, Belt meticulously 
studied the country’s wildlife in accordance with Darwin’s evolutionary principles. These 
studies, along with ethnological observations of Nicaragua’s human inhabitants, formed the 
bedrock of his memoir. Although little studied in the twenty-first century, Naturalist in 
Nicaragua won high praise from Belt’s scientific contemporaries. In a letter to Joseph Dalton 
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Hooker, dated March 25, 1874, Darwin described the book as “the best of all the Nat. Hist. 
journals which have ever been published” (Darwin 1874). Wallace was similarly impressed, 
writing in a review, “Mr. Belt is a close, an accurate, and an intelligent observer. He possesses 
the valuable faculty of wonder at whatever is new, or strange, or beautiful in nature; and the 
equally valuable habit of seeking a reason for all that he sees” (1874, 218). Belt would die only 
four years after the publication of his book, struck down by fever while studying glacial deposits 
in Colorado, still in his forties. However, one obituary confidently declared, “The name of 
Thomas Belt will not be forgotten. Though he has passed away from us in the flower of his age, 
the work that he has done has gained for him a position in the scientific world to which few of 
greater years attain. . . . In the departments of Natural Science to which he applied himself his 
name stands as an authority, and his work is quoted as that of a master” (Wright 1880, 238). Belt 
failed to achieve the long-lasting fame of many of his peers, but his memoir was a popular and 
influential text in Victorian natural history literature. 
The memoir was written under the mentorship of Bates and described many examples of 
protective mimicry that Belt claimed to have observed, along with other forms of deceptive 
animal behavior.14 Such deception sometimes seemed intentional. For example, watching an 
army of ants tearing through the forest, Belt noted that “spiders generally were most intelligent in 
escaping.” He observes one spider amid the ants “lifting, one after the other, its long legs, which 
supported its body above their reach. Sometimes as many as five out of its eight legs would be 
lifted at once” (19). Belt’s description seems to imply that the spider realizes the ants will only 
attack what they sense with their tactile organs. It appears to possess the mental abstraction to 
imagine the perceptions of others—what psychologists now call “theory of mind” (see Wynne 
2004, 175–82). 
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However, such attribution of Machiavellian intelligence to animals was countered in 
Belt’s thinking by a strong interest in hereditary instinct, which he also offered as the cause of 
deceptive behavior. While his anecdotes of individual animals can often seem to treat them as 
conscious deceivers, Belt’s visions of broader, evolutionary trends suggest, conversely, that such 
creatures are following fixed, instinctive promptings shaped by generations of variation and 
selective pressures. Although Belt highlighted the role of behavior in many animal mimicries 
(such as holding still or assuming a certain pose), he was uncomfortable with the agential 
connotations of “mimicry” as a term. Echoing Wallace, he wrote, “I must explain that it is only 
on account of the poverty of our language that we have to speak of one species imitating another, 
as if it were a conscious act. No such idea is entertained, and it might have been well if some 
new term had been adopted to express what is meant” (8). The potential automatism of deceptive 
animal actions is shown when Belt observes a locust that escapes the ant army’s detection by 
freezing still as they walk over it. Yet, instead of attributing this action to intelligent calculation, 
Belt explains it by a “fixed . . . instinctive knowledge that its safety depended on its 
immovability” (19). At other times, Belt wavers between treating animals as intentional 
deceivers and mere organic machines blindly following their instincts. This uncertainty is 
discernible in an anecdote in which he nearly steps within biting distance of a live alligator. He 
had mistakenly thought that the alligator was dead due its stillness, others having been recently 
shot nearby. Luckily, Belt sees the creature’s eye following him and retreats just in time. He 
demurs from pronouncing on the possible intentionality or automatism of the alligator’s stillness, 
writing, “It is the habit of these animals to lie quite still, and catch animals that come near them. 
Whether or not he was waiting until I came within the swoop of his mighty tail I know not, but I 
had the feeling that I had escaped a great danger” (9). Prefiguring the strict empiricism of 
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twentieth-century behaviorist psychology, Belt retreats from inferring unseen mental operations 
to merely recording external actions or “habits.” 
Yet such possible intentions are not necessary for deception to take place, since Belt 
formulates this as receivers interpreting signs rather than senders consciously transmitting 
messages. Animals thus encroach on the human-held territory of agency and cognition less by 
deceiving others than by being deceived themselves. Their capacity to be mistaken reflects the 
nonmechanical nature of their existence. Their actions are not merely links in fixed chains of 
necessity but arise from subjective experience, however seemingly limited when compared with 
that of humans. The mechanistic link between cause and effect loosens into a more open and 
flexible play of semiosis. This flexibility is an inevitable part of Belt’s evolutionary vision as 
deceptive organisms and their perceivers survive in the perpetual arms race described by 
Hoffmeyer. Increasingly sophisticated deceptions necessitate more sophisticated forms of 
looking to unmask them, as Belt comments: “Natural selection not only tends to pick out and 
preserve the forms that have protective resemblances, but to increase the perceptions of the 
predatory species.” He outlines this principle with an imaginary example of dogs marooned on 
an island where food sources are limited and fast moving. Over generations, he argues, not only 
would the dog population become faster as slower dogs died out, but also “the dogs might 
increase in cunning, or combine together to work in couples or in packs by the same selective 
process” (383). Detecting, pursuing, and avoiding other animals are by no means straightforward 
actions and can involve increasing perceptual and cognitive complexity as these rivals become 
wilier and more elusive. 
Belt illustrates this process through his observations of animals adapting to register and 
interpret indexical signs of their predators. He studies an area thick with spiders’ webs and 
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wonders how the butterflies nearby know to avoid these traps. Belt reports that “getting behind 
them, and trying to frighten them within the silken curtain, their instinct taught them to avoid it, 
for, although startled, they threaded their way through open spaces and between the webs with 
the greatest ease. It was one instance of many I have noticed of the strong instinct implanted in 
insects to avoid their natural enemies” (109). The functioning of the spiders’ webs as devices for 
procuring food is derailed by the insects’ interpretive aversion, however simple and fixed this 
may seem. More challenging to mechanistic views of nature are Belt’s depictions of animals as 
beings that learn to differentiate signs of things rather than doing so simply by instinct. Belt 
claims that the country’s leaf-cutting ants learn through experience to collect leaves, 
demonstrated by younger ants carrying unsuitable objects into the nest such as grass. These 
mistakes are corrected by older ants, however, as Belt writes: “After a while these pieces are 
always brought out again and thrown away. I can imagine a young ant getting a severe ear-
wigging from one of the major-domos for its stupidity” (83). The anthropomorphic imagery 
reflects Belt’s high estimation of ant society as a semiosphere. The communication systems 
within their colonies seem so complex that Belt is even moved to elide their social and 
psychological differences from humans, writing, “Perhaps if we could learn their wonderful 
language we should find that even in their mental condition they also rank next to humanity” 
(27). Conversely, the ants’ rivals are shown to survive by eluding or sabotaging the semiotic 
network between the ants. While the stillness of the aforementioned locust creates a nonsignal 
for the army obliviously marching over it, birds hide from the swarm by nesting in holes of trees, 
“with their heads ever turned to the only entrance.” This strategy, Belt notes, enables them “to 
pick off the solitary parties when they first approach, and thus prevent them from carrying to the 
main army intelligence about the nest” (23). Belt’s account frames the struggle for life as what 
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we might now call a semiotic struggle, with rival species adapting to each other’s Umwelten. 
Belt further eroded distinctions between human and animal experience by claiming to 
demonstrate animal deceptions through anecdotes of his own misperceptions in the field. His 
stories of being beguiled by insects’ and other creatures’ appearances presented his human 
impressions as proxies for those of animals. After encountering numerous stinging ants in one 
region, Belt recalls swinging his net and seeing inside it “what appeared to be” one of the ants. 
However, “it was a small spider that closely resembled an ant, and so perfect was the imitation 
that it was not until I killed it that I determined that it was a spider and that I need not be afraid 
of it stinging me” (314). In another vignette, he “observed what appeared to be a hornet, with 
brown semi-transparent wings and yellow antennae. It ran along the ground vibrating its wings 
and antennae exactly like a hornet, and I caught it in my net, believing it to be one.” Again, only 
close examination reveals the creature to be a hemipteran, or true bug, “a widely different order” 
to that of the hornet (319). Belt’s series of impressions mirror the imagined perceptual processes 
of insectivorous animals deceived by the spider’s and bug’s resemblances to unpalatable species. 
While Belt’s anatomical examination of specimens gives him an informed, reflective vision that 
these predators lack, his immediate, embodied perceptions of the mimics on the wing are 
imagined as a shared experience with nonhumans. 
Belt’s sense that visual impressions could form an empathic bridge between humans and 
animals drew energy from Victorian art theory, which sometimes framed such immediate 
sensory experience as anterior to ideation. The critic John Ruskin called for artistic vision with 
an “innocence of the eye,” which would naively capture the colors, shapes, and tones of raw 
sight prior to the intervention of intellect (1857, 6). Such “innocent” vision could be imagined as 
comparable to the sentience of animals. In this vein, Belt writes in awe of “the wonderful 
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perfection of mimetic forms,” offering his aesthetic pleasure at the uncanny resemblances as a 
vehicle for empathizing with animals that also glimpse them (384). Belt’s descriptions of 
camouflaged animals sometimes even carry the style of ekphrasis, apprehending nature’s 
appearances like the suggestive lines and colors of a painting. One tree lizard “is not only of a 
beautiful green colour, but has foliaceous expansions on its limbs and body, so that even when 
amongst the long grass it looks like a leafy shoot that has fallen from the trees above” (340). 
Similarly, as Ruskin celebrated the ability of painters to capture nature’s “illusions” on canvas, 
Belt depicts natural environments and the animals indigenous to them as arrangements of colors 
and contrasts that trick the eye. When discussing birds that blend in with vegetation, he recalls 
“once in Australia firing at what I thought was a solitary ‘green leek’ parrot amongst a bunch of 
leaves, and to my astonishment five ‘green leeks’ fell to the ground, the whole bunch of apparent 
leaves having been composed of them” (197). Through such impressionistic anecdotes of his 
perceptions in the field, Belt encourages his readers to imagine life through the eyes of 
animals—to conceptualize them as not machines or dead specimens but sentient beings who, like 
humans, experience the world subjectively, albeit with different sensory organs and, perhaps, 
less mental abstraction. 
Belt’s approach to animal mimicry as semiotic play fitted into a larger vision of the living 
world as endless networks of signs and interpreters. Protective mimicry was often dependent on 
other species’ aposematism, that is, conspicuous signs that identified them as unpalatable or 
equipped with other defenses. Hence, an arms race existed not only between perceiving and 
deceiving animals but also aposematic organisms and those that mimicked them. Unpalatable 
species could still be killed or injured by predators whose encounters with palatable mimics had 
eroded the association between the species’ appearance and unpalatability. Consequently, 
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animals’ aposematic advertisements tended toward increasing complexity and variety in tandem 
with predators’ increasingly sophisticated perceptions and mimics’ increasingly exact 
resemblances. Belt demonstrates this dynamic through an anecdote of three macaws, which he 
recalls 
wheeling round and round in playful flight, now showing all red on the under surface, 
then turning . . . and showing the gorgeous blue, yellow, and red of the upper side 
gleaming in the sunshine; screaming meanwhile as they flew with harsh, discordant cries. 
This gaudy-coloured and noisy bird seems to proclaim aloud that it fears no foe. Its 
formidable beak protects it from every danger, for no hawk or predatory mammal dares 
attack a bird so strongly armed (196). 
Belt’s description downplays the question of how much of the macaws’ actions might spring 
from mindless instinct or conscious choice; his focus is on how these actions form salient, 
distinctive signs to potential aggressors like himself. His aesthetic experience of the birds, 
converted into verbal art for readers, functions as a vehicle for interspecies empathy. The deep 
impressions that the macaws’ bright colors and wince-inducing sounds make on Belt 
approximate the impressions that they make on other animals. However, as in contemporary 
biosemiotics, Belt’s empathetic visions of animal semiosis do not so much anthropomorphize 
animals as decenter communication from humans. Belt sometimes depicted animal 
communication in anthropomorphic terms, such as in his descriptions of the “language” of ants. 
Yet he presented his impressionistic accounts of animals’ appearances as insights into nonhuman 
life through their grounding in immediate, bodily sensation and barely conscious perceptual 
associations. 
Belt’s example demonstrates that biosemiotics involves not only extending seemingly 
exclusively human concepts such as meaning and interpretation to animals but also, potentially, 
extending “animal” models of unreflective perception and reactions to humans. Maran comments 
that, unlike the Cartesian model of immaterial mind, the “semiotic self is a multilayered 
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structure, based on all memory-capable codes in the body,” rising through “immunological, 
neurological, cognitive and in the case of human animals also verbal and narrative layers” (2010, 
325). Maran suggests that a field of literary criticism might be founded on biosemiotics, which 
would explore “communicative and sign relations between human cultural activities and other 
semiotic subjects and their representation in literature” (2014, 262). I hope that my brief 
discussion of Belt’s memoir can stand as a modest contribution to this nascent field. Belt’s self-
representation in the text as an embodied perceiver, experiencing Nicaragua’s rainforests as a 
flood of sensory impressions, ran against the growing discourse of scientific objectivity at the 
time, which revered mechanical forms of observation imagined as undistorted by biased human 
perception.15 However, this personal, visceral style served as a vehicle for rethinking semiosis in 
nonanthropocentric terms. Belt’s visions point toward a new model of sign making and 
interpretation as universal processes, which no longer cut humans off from the rest of the organic 
world but, on the contrary, merged them with it. 
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Notes 
The research for this article was funded by a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship. 
1. On the history of biological mimicry as a concept, see Komarek (1998) and Forbes (2009). 
2. See Maclean (2002, 276–332) and Wood (2000, 19–24). 
3. See Wheeler (2016, 20–21). One exception to this trend was John Poinsot’s obscure 
Tractatus de Signis (1632), which suggested that signs might be central to the lives of many 
animals as well as humans. See Poinsot (2013). 
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4. On the history of scientific objectivity and anthropomorphism, see White (2005), Crist 
(1999), and Knoll (1997). 
5. Montebello (2003, 13–14), quoted and translated in Weemans and Prévost (2014, 6–7). 
6. See, for example, Richard Rorty’s (1979) argument that Western philosophy from the 
seventeenth century onward constructed the mind as a reflective mirror of retinal images 
(45). 
7. In Jonathan Crary’s words, vision changed from “a privileged form of knowing” to “itself an 
object of knowledge” (1990, 5). 
8. On the complex role of Malthusianism in the history of evolutionary theory, see Hale (2012). 
9. The question of intentionality still enters into the subfield of “zoopragmatics,” which 
concerns how animals encode messages. However, many researchers only concede that 
signals can even begin to be classed as “symbolic” or “goal directed” in communication 
among primates. See Nöth (1995, 159). 
10. On the complex, overlapping rhetorical structures of anthropomorphism, mechanomorphism, 
and zoomorphism, see Garrard (2012, 152–70). 
11. On narrative focalization and human-animal boundaries, see Nelles (2001). 
12. On the intersections between the travel memoir and natural history, see Smethurst (2013, 43–
50). 
13. On the origin of the term “semiosphere,” see Lotman (2005). 
14. Belt dedicated his memoir to Bates, declaring the latter’s Naturalist on the River Amazons 
(1863) “my guide and model” (iii). 
15. On the rise of this discourse of “mechanical objectivity” in the late nineteenth century, see 
Daston and Galison (2007, 115–90). 
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